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Fed Policy announcements have always created controversy when analyzing its effects 
on asset prices. This project analyzes the relationship between the Fed announcements 
and the stock market’s return. We use an econometric methodology suggested by 
Kenneth Kuttner (2000) that uses the futures market to divide the announcement in two 
parts the expected and unexpected component. 
The relationship between the equity market reaction and the Fed policy announcements 
has shown to be statistically significant. A considerably negative reaction of the equity 
market has been observed in response to an unexpected announcement by the Federal 
Reserve while the expected part of the announcement revealed to have no effect on the 
equity market. This relation was also tested for the existence of asymmetries and cross 























Table of contents 
 
1. Project Purpose………………………………………………………………4 
2. Literature review………………………...…………………………………..6 
3. Methodology………………...……………………………………..………..10 
3.1 Federal Funds Future Market…………………………….……...11 
3.2 The Error Term……….. …………………………………………14 
4. Results ………………………………………………………………………15 
4.1Equity Market Reaction to Policy Announcements ……...…………16 
4.2 Hypothesis testing ……………...……………………………………..17 
4.3 Asymmetries ….…....….………………………………………………19 
4.4 Industries…………… ………………………………………………...20 
4.5 Subprime crisis………………………………………………………..21 
 5- Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..23 
 References……………………………………………………………………...25 
 Appendices 
 Appendix 1: Relationship between the implied rate and the expectations of 
target Federal rates..........................................................................................................27 
Appendix 2: Evolution of the target rate...................................................27 
Appendix 3: Equity prices reaction to monetary policy actions..................28 
Appendix 4: The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation Lagrange Multiplier test 
for serial correlation............................................................................................28 
Appendix 5: The white`s test………………………………………………...29 
Appendix 6: The t-test statistic………………………………………………...29 
Appendix 7: The F-statistic……………………………………………………30 
Appendix 8: Results for three different types of asymmetries………………...30 
Appendix 9: The cross industry regression……………………………………31 
Appendix 10: Subprime effect……………………………………………….32 





















1. Project purpose 
Commercial Banks are responsible for providing credit conditions to the economy. 
However, it is frequent that banks borrow money from other banks (usually overnight 
loans) to meet their reserves requirements. These operations are performed on the 
Federal Funds market that reallocates the reserves in the economy, the rate paid on 
those loans is the Federal Funds rate (Nosal, 2001). In order to control money 
circulation the Federal Reserve (Fed) attempts to manipulate the rate paid on these 
loans. However, this rate is dependent on the reserve transactions set by each 
Commercial Bank. In order to control the rate paid on the Federal Funds market and 
subsequently the money in circulation the Fed sets a benchmark rate: the target rate. 
This rate changes every time the Federal Reserve performs an announcement.  
Even though the target rate changes aim is to control macroeconomic variables, 
financial markets are the first to react indicating that relevant information is released to 
the market whenever the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) performs a policy 
announcement. The transmission effect in theory can be summarized by an increase in 
the target Federal Funds rate that leads to a decrease in the demand for money by 
Commercial Banks, since money becomes more expensive. Monetary circulation 
decreases and an immediate increase in the market interest rate is observed. The credit 
conditions provided to firms and individuals deteriorate reducing future wealth 
perspectives. As so, if investors are rational they are expected to react positively to a 
policy easing and negatively to a tight policy action.   
The aim of this project is to measure and analyze the stock market return when exposed 
to Federal policy actions. Although there is significant literature about monetary policy 
and its effects, little research has focused on the cross sector and industry effect. This 
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project will assess this question by testing the relationship for the existence of 
asymmetries and by improving past research through the addition of a new relevant 
dependent variable. To avoid any bias related to the Subprime crises, results will be first 
analysed from data collected before the Subprime (1994-2007) and subsequently 
including the Subprime observation (1994-2009) in order to understand if there are 
significant changes on the behaviour. If results prove to be significant, the relationship 
between the monetary policy shocks and the equity market will be better estimated.  
As Rigobon and Sack (2002) point out a good estimate is in the interest of all market 
players. This estimation is important not only for the investors in order to build 
strategies to obtain return from the market but also for the policy makers to perform 
more efficient policy decisions.   
This study follows the methodology developed by Kenneth Kuttner (2000). This author 
focuses on the anticipation effect, suggesting that if markets are efficient, as it is 
assumed, they can anticipate the outcome of the announcement leading to no effect on 
the financial market. Only the unanticipated changes on the target rate should influence 
the equity market return. This view is in line with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. This 
might explain why past literature as estimated a week relationship between policy 
announcements and asset prices.  
To assess the unanticipated component Kuttner (2000) proposes to use the Federal 
Funds futures market to calculate the unexpected component of the surprise.  The 
project will focus on the observation of the change in the Federal Funds future implied 
rate and from this findings analyse the market expectations of the announcement 
outcome. Although this financial instrument is traded since 1989, it is only in 1994 that 
the changes in the funds rate target became announced. To have some stability in the 
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way financial markets receive the news from the FOMC announcements this work will 
introduce a new data set, starting from February 1994 until June of 2007 just before the 
beginning of the subprime crisis. 
2. Literature review 
During the last century many authors tried to study monetary policy shocks on other 
variables. However, a lot of controversy has been discussed on which variables should 
be used to assess this effect. In this section a broad overview of the area of interest will 
be analysed based on past research.   
Before 1994 different targeting approaches were used to control monetary circulation. 
In 1979 Federal Fund rate target was abandoned to start targeting no borrowed reserves 
until 1982, from 1982 – 1987 it focused on a borrowing guideline. It was only in 1987 
with the appointment of Alan Greenspan that the funds rate became re-used to 
determine shifts on policy actions (Jones, 1994)
1
. It is important to remark that before 
1994 the Fed didn’t make announcements for shifts on the targeting approach, as today. 
In this sense, it was more difficult for market participants to understand changes on the 
monetary policy since the only tool they had was the following day actions of the open 
market committee.  
Facing with this problem of an accurate identification of the monetary policy actions, 
Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (1999) used the changes in interest rates to identify the 
monetary policy. However, this methodology might be biased since interest rates 
changes usually coincide with changes on the macroeconomics conditions. More 
complex analysis was used by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) that defined 
                                                          
1
  In Thorbecke, Willem. 1997.” On stock Market Returns and Monetary Policy”, The Journal of Finance, 
LII (2): 635-654. 
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the monetary policy by using a VAR model which uses macroeconomic variables as a 
proxy for monetary policy.  
Cook and Hahn (1988) were the pioneers of using an event study approach to measure 
the relationship between the stock market and the Fed policy actions. Their basic 
assumption was that the Fed controlled the funds rate so rigorously during the 1974 -
1979 period that market participants were able to detect a change in the target funds rate 
on the day it occurred. If market participants were able to assess and process the new 
monetary information on the same day of the announcement then it could be used daily 
data to regress the change in the bill notes and bond rates on the target rate change. 
Results revealed a positive correlation between the target rate response and the bond 
rate, but less significant for longer maturities. This could indicate that some Fed actions 
may have been anticipated. Roley and Sellon (1995) used the same approach but for a 
more recent period (1987 - 1995) and got a much weaker relationship between target 
rate changes and other interest rates which could indicate that financial markets 
improved their capacity to anticipate changes in the target rate.  
Kenneth Kuttner (2000) however took special attention in what concerns the 
anticipation effect and separated the announcement into two different components: 
expected and unexpected. According to him, the financial market reacts only to the 
unanticipated component of the FOMC policy announcements. Some controversy 
appeared when estimating the market expectations about the FOMC announcements. 
What Kuttner suggested was to use the Federal Funds futures implied rate to assess the 
policy surprise. His argument was based under the assumption that “Fed Funds futures 
prices are a natural, market-based proxy for policy actions expectations”.  
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Others authors have used different market-based instruments to assess the surprise. For 
instance, Michel Ehrmann and Marcel Fratzscher (2004) measured the surprise using 
Reuter’s survey performed on the Fridays just before the announcements. Roberto 
Rigobon and Brian Sack (2002) used the three-month Eurodollar rate to assess the 
surprise component of the announcement suggesting that the Eurodollar is better to 
estimate expectations of the market about the target rate for near-term  maturities while 
the Future Federal Funds rate are better for shorter maturities. To dissipate any doubt 
about which financial instrument work better to assess the market expectations about 
the future target rate Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2006) have performed an 
evaluation of the most relevant financial instruments that can serve as a tool to calculate 
the surprise component, suggesting that Federal Funds Futures dominate other market-
based measures for policy expectations since the predictive power was higher, 
evidenced by a smaller risk premium when compared to other marked-based 
instruments but only up to six months horizons, for long term perspective results 
showed to be similar. 
Monika Piazzesi and Eric Swanson (2006) explained why it is appealing to use this 
future financial instrument. “First, producing the forecast is simple (given that) rates on 
various contracts can be obtained (...) at any time during the day. Second, the forecasts 
work well (since) Federal Funds futures outperform forecasts based on alternative 
methods (...). Third, previous studies have failed to find significant risk premia in Fed 
Funds futures”.  
However a lot of controversy regarding the methodology with the Federal Funds 
Futures rate has also been evidenced. Glenn Rudebusch (1998) also uses the Federal 
Fund Futures to assess the surprise component however its methodology is different 
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from the one introduced by Kuttner. He defines the surprise as the difference between 
the realized Federal Funds rate target and the expected Federal Funds rate derived from 
the futures market. On the other hand, Kenneth Kuttner (2000) defines the surprise 
component as the daily change in the current-month or one month maturity Federal 
Funds Futures rate on the event day in order to assess the surprise component. After 
analysing the robustness of the two monetary surprises series, Piazzesi and Swanson 
(2006) found that on the first approach the presence of risk premium will negatively 
bias the final results for market expectations. While the second one revealed to be more 
solid for the presence of risk premium.  
More recently, Refet S. Gürkaynak, Brian Sack and Eric T. Swanson (2004) have 
improved the Kenneth Kuttner approach to measure the stock market response to 
monetary policy actions by looking at intra-day data in narrow windows around the 
announcement time. This procedure attenuates the “noise” from other financial market 
news that took place throughout the day allowing to better isolate the effect of the 
surprise component on the asset prices. In the end they got similar results but much 
more precise.  
Although a lot of research has been conducted on monetary policy and its effects, little 
literature has focused on the sector and industry effect. Gert Peersman and Frank Smets 
(2002) found strong evidence of cross industry effect on the response to policy 
announcements. The results revealed that different industries have different sensibilities 
to policy announcements accordingly to the durability of the goods produced, 
suggesting that the monetary policy effect on industries producing durable goods was 
almost the triple than those producing less durable goods. Moreover the capital intensity 
and the degree of openness appear also to influence the response across industries. This 
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demonstrates the importance and relevance of assessing the cross industry effect for 
policy analyze.  
3. Methodology 
In order to have a good estimation of the relationship between the FOMC 
announcements and the stock market it will be assessed the stock market expectation of 
the FOMC committee actions through the future market. After a good estimation of the 
market expectations it is possible to use the following regression using the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) method: 
  unt eeR .. 2
exp
10  
tR  is the equity market response measured  by the daily return of the S&P 500 stock 
index on day t, expe  and une  are the expected and unexpected components of the 
announcement and   is the error term (all the other factors that influence the stock 
market return beside the FOMC announcement) (Bernanke et al, 2005).  
Beside this equation this project will innovate by introducing an extra explainable 
variable that accounts the equity market volatility on FOMC announcement days. To 
measure the equity market volatility it will be used the VIX index. This new variable 
will consists on an interactive dummy, which multiplies the unexpected component by 
the VIX dummy variable. To calculate the dummy variable it is necessary to first 
calculate the average of the VIX index prices. The dummy variable will be accounted 
as “1” each time its value is 25% higher to the average of the VIX prices. The new 
regression turns into: 




t eVIXeeR  
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 The logic is that on days of high market volatility the “noise” associated with other 
news around the policy announcement will be higher dispersing the normal stock 
market response from its normal reaction decreasing the quality of these observations. 
To reduce the error term, Gurkaynak Sack and Swanson (2004) approach should be 
used. This model focuses on the intraday data in narrow windows around the 
announcement time which gives similar but more precise results than previous studies 
that used daily data. However because of data limitations this project cannot use 
intraday data. After consulting Kenneth Kuttner by e-mail on how to reduce “the noise” 
associated with news arriving “after hours” he suggested calculating the stock market 








Data will be collected from the Bloomberg software. Two observations (03 January 
2001 and 17 September 2001) will be excluded because on those days the volatility on 
the stock market is heavily explained by other factors.  
3.1 Federal Funds Future Market 
The Federal Funds Future contract is an interest rate future traded in CBOT, its 
underlying asset is the average Federal Funds rate over a particular month. These 
contracts can be viewed as the right for one bank to receive an overnight loan by 
another bank at some future date at a predetermined rate, the Federal Funds Future rate.  
The Bloomberg screen quotes this financial instrument as r100  where r is the average 
Effective Federal Funds rate over the expiry month.   
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The logic behind the use of Federal Funds Futures to assess target rate expectations is 
that possible deviations of the actual overnight rate from the desired target rate tend to 
be averaged out on the remaining part of the month, allowing the implied rate in the 
future contract to be essentially the market´s expectation of the intended target rate.  
Appendix 1 demonstrates the relationship between the implied rate by the contracts and 
the expectations of target Federal rates, revealing a strong correlation. In a research 
conducted by Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2006) it was demonstrated that on 
horizons up to six months, using Federal Funds future rate, showed to do better than all 
other market based measures in predicting actual future funds rate.  
When using Federal Funds futures to extrapolate the surprise component it is important 
to formulate some assumptions (Refet Gürkaynak, 2005). First the model assumes that 
on “policy dates future intermeeting rate changes are seen as a zero probability events” 
which if we look to their frequency since 1994 is a very reasonable assumption. Second, 
when calculating the policy surprise it is assumed that the Effective Funds rate is equal 
to the target rate. Finally, but not least, it is assumed that the change in the term 
premium around the policy dates is insignificant. However, it is important to highlight 
that it is not the term premium that is negligible but the change during the day of the 
announcement.  
This work is only going to focus on the surprise component of the current policy 
decision, as so the spot future rate denoted by tf  will be used for the event occurred on 
day t. As Gürkaynak (2005) explains on the day before the FOMC meeting the 




















Where jd stand for the day in the month when the event takes place and jm the number 
of days on that month. In this equation, 1r  and 0r are, respectively, the target rate 
prevailing before and after the FOMC announcement. 1tu is the term premium for the 
spot month contract which, as it will be demonstrated, it will not interfere in the 
calculations of the surprise component. After the policy decision is known the implied 

















For the purpose of this model it is assumed that Effective Funds rates are equal to the 
target rate. Using equation (1) and (2) to measure the surprise component, denoted 
by une : 









   
As it was previously mentioned, the model assumes that the daily risk premium change 
on FOMC announcement days is insignificant and therefore ignored. This assumption 










   
This equation explains how it is possible to use the future market to calculate the 
surprise component of the announcement. The second part of the equation is required 
because the surprise will only matter to the remaining part of the month. After having 
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calculated the unexpected component it is possible to assess what the market already 
expected: unere  ~exp  where r~ is the new target rate. 
 
For some observations the way to calculate the surprise component is slightly different: 
 If the announcement is on the first day of the month the appropriate future rate at 
t-1 is going to be the future rate on the last day of the previous month with one 
month to maturity (instead of the spot rate). The policy surprise will be 









  .  From 1994 to June 2007 there is only one 
observation on the 1
st
 day of the month, in September 2005. 
 When the announcement is done on the last days of the month the scale factor 
amplifies too much the noise in the measurement of the surprise component. 
Refet Gürkaynak (2005) suggests that whenever the scale factor is greater than 4 
it should be used the one month maturity future rate and no scale factor is used 
because the policy action affects the expected rate in the entire subsequent 
month. The formula becomes, 11
1
 tt
un ffe  
 In 15 October 1998 the 0, 25% rate cut was announced after the close of the 
future market. In this case, the difference between the Opening rate on the 16
th
 
and the closing rate on the 15
th
 is used. 
3.2 The Error term 
The Least Squared Regression relies on some assumptions, when they are not verified 
error estimations might occur and hence bias the hypothesis tested.  
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The first violation would be if the independent variable (policy action) responded 
endogenously to the dependent variable (stock market return). According to Rigobon 
and Sack (2003) there is empirical evidence that sustain such argument, they assert that 
a 5% rise in the S&P500 increases the probability of a policy tightening on the next 
FOMC meeting by 25 basis points. Other authors contradict this theory by finding little 
evidence that the FOMC responds to stock prices (Jeff Fuhrer and Geoff Tootell, 2004). 
“There are, however, no clear examples of instances in which a drop in equity prices led 
the FOMC to cut rates, or the inverse” (Bernanke and Kuttner 2005). This project will 
assume no endogenous response from policy actions to movements on the stock market. 
Secondly, other type of endogeneity would be a response from the stock market and 
from policy actions to new information. However, after consulting Kenneth Kuttner by 
e-mail his suggestion was unequivocal: “I don't think that's a big issue post-1994, if 
you're using daily data.  It was really only in the early 1990s that the Fed reacted on the 
same day to employment releases”. 
4. Results 
From February 1994 to June 2006 there are 111 valid observations. During this period 
there were 63 announcements with no target rate change, 17 cuts and 31 increases. 
Appendix 2 illustrates the evolution of the target rate, starting at 3.25% on February 94 
and reaching 6, 5% on May 2000 during the Dot-com euphoric times. In response to the 
bubble burst, the target rate declined until the 1 per cent level in June 2003, finally with 
the economic recovery in 2004 the target rate reached the 5.25% level. The equity 
market has completely anticipated the outcome of the announcement in 42 occasions 
which corresponds to 38% of the observations and the equity market had an average 
daily return of 0. 27% on those 111 days that composes the project data set. The 
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correlation between the stock market and target rate change is -0, 07 but if the surprise 
component of the target change is used the correlation becomes -0, 42 a much more 
significant value.  
These statistics give a general perspective of how the stock market and the Fed behave 
on the announcement days from 1994 to 2007.  
4.1 Equity Market reaction to Policy Announcements 
The estimated reaction of equity prices to monetary policy actions are reported on 
Appendix 3. All variables are expressed in percentage terms. The threshold level for all 
the tests was assumed at a significance of 5%. The column a) reports the results for the 
Original regression while column b) reports the regression with the VIX Index. 
Regression (a) indicate that an expected change of 1% will induce the equity market to 
an increase of  0.85%  while a 1% unexpected change will bring a decrease of -7.479% 
on the stock market. The adjusted R
2
 indicates that on days of policy actions 20.4% of 
the equity market variance is associated with monetary policy news. Regression (b) 
suggest that an 1% change on the target rate that was already expected by the market 
will induce the equity market to increase by 0.96% while the unexpected change of 1% 
will bring down the equity market by -5.71% . Finally the additional variable tells that 
when there is a 1% surprise action on days of high market volatility, the equity market 
will decrease by -7.61%. The R
2
 indicate that policy announcements account for 
24.47% of the daily reported variance on the equity market. This result suggests that 
observations associated with days of high equity market volatility inflate the negative 
response of the stock market to a policy surprise change. 
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After looking to both R
2
 it is possible to conclude that the second regression is better to 
estimate the market response to policy announcements. However, it is necessary to test 
the significance of those values and see if the assumptions behind the construction of 
the Least Square Model are valid. 
4.2 Hypothesis testing  
First it will be tested the sustainability of the OLS assumptions and ensure the no 
existence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Subsequently, it will be preformed 
significance tests on the variables and on the regression. 
To investigate the existence of serial correlation it was used the Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation Lagrange Multiplier test for (Appendix 4). This consists in testing the null 
hypothesis 0H of no serial correlation against the alternative hypothesis 1H that the 
errors are serial correlated. The test consists “in regressing the residuals on all 
regressors and lagged residuals and then obtains the R
2
 of this regression”. The test 
statistic is given by ´)( 2RObs  ~ 2k . For a 5% significance level and two degrees of 
freedom the critical value is 5.99946. The test statistic for regression (a) and (b) are 
respectively 1.910448 and 2.542301 which allow to no rejection of  the null hypothesis 
in both cases and accept the assumption of no serial correlation. 
Once both regressions have passed the serial correlation test it is possible to test them 
for the presence of heteroskedasticity. To see if regression (a) and (b) are homoscedastic 
it will be used the white`s test (Appendix 5). This test defines the null hypothesis as the 
existence of homocedasticity or 220 :  iH against the alternative hypothesis defined 
as the existence of heteroskedasticity or 221 : iiH   . The test statistic is computed 
from an auxiliary regression where the squared residuals are regressed on all possible 
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cross products of the regressors. Then it is necessary to multiply the number of 
observation by the R
2
 of the auxiliary regression. This statistic follows a 2k distribution 
with the degree of freedom equal to the number of slope coefficients of the auxiliary 
regression. In regression (a) for a 5% significance level and five degrees of freedom the 
critical value is 11.07050 while in regression (b) for a 5% significance level and 6 
degrees of freedom the critical value is 12.59159. The test statistics for regression (a) is 
3.030426 while in (b) is 11.74615 leading to the no rejection of the null hypothesis 
concluding the existence of homocedasticity.  
To test if the single estimators have effect on the stock market it must be used the two 
tailed t-student test (Appendix 6). The null hypothesis is that 0j meaning that if it is 
accepted the independent variable associated with that parameter does not have any 





and it follows a two tailed 
T-student distribution with n-k-1 degrees of freedom. The results for this test are 
reported in Appendix 6. For regression (a) it is obtained a significant value for the 
unexpected value but an insignificant one for the expected component which 
demonstrate the no relationship between the expected component of the announcement 
and the equity market return. In regression (b), curiously, each one of the three 
independent variables with 95% of confidence is relevant to explain the equity market 
return.     
To see if the independent variables together are useful to explain the daily equity market 
return, the F –test was preformed. The null hypothesis is that the expected and the 
unexpected component of the announcement do not help to explain the daily equity 
market return or: 0: exp0 
uneeH and the alternative hypothesis is that at least one 
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variable is different from 0. The F-statistic is used to execute the test. Results are 
reported in Appendix 7. In both regressions the null hypothesis is rejecting, concluding 
that at least one of the predictors is linearly associated to the daily stock market return. 
Both regressions are valid and significant. The results are in accordance with the general 
theory that a cut on the target rate will lead to an increase on the stock market, and vice 
versa. Both unexpected parameters are statistically relevant at a 1% significance value 
revealing the importance of this factor to explain the equity market return on days of 
policy action. The VIX Interactive dummy variable revealed to be very useful to explain 
the stock market response to policy actions, the results suggest that a 1% surprise 
associated with days of high market volatility will induce the stock market to decrease 
by  -7.6% while in “quiet” days the response is -5.7%. This result might suggest that 
news arriving “after hours” are distorting the equity market reaction to policy 
announcements in previous literature.  
4.3 Asymmetries 
Asymmetries are defined as “the possibility that the equity prices response to monetary 
policy depends on the direction of the action” (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). Little 
research has explored the existence of asymmetries when measuring the relationship 
between the equity market and Fed policy announcements. This project has verified the 
effect of three different asymmetries. The VIX index variable will continue to stay on 
the regression since it was demonstrated the importance of such variable. 
Appendix 8 report the results for three different types of asymmetries, first it verifies if 
the equity market reacts differently accordingly to the sign of the surprise change. The 
second and third column analyze if the equity market reacts asymmetrically to a positive 
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rate change or to a no change by the FOMC. The results for the interactive dummy 
variable revealed not significant for the first two types of asymmetry however it was 
evidenced that equity markets react differently to a no movement on the target rate. For 
the dummy “Rate change = 0” it is possible to say with a 95% confidence that when 
there is a 1% surprise change associated with a zero target rate change the return on 
equity market will increase by more 8. 66% in comparison with a surprise associated 
with a movement on the target rate by the FOMC. This result is very significant since it 
shows that investors are more hysterical when the policy surprise is associated with a no 
movement by the Fed on the target rate. In the end of the table it is possible to observe 
the no existence of serial correlation or heteroskedasticity.  
4.4 Industries 
In the cross industry regressions (Appendix 9), an analysis of the R
2
 revealed that in an 
observation of 10 industries, 5 of them revealed that it is possible to construct a 
relationship between its daily return and the Fed policy announcements.  Namely, 
Consumer Discretionary (R
2 





=0, 24), Financials (R
2
=0, 17) and Materials (R
2
=0, 14). It is important to highlight 
that the unexpected coefficient in the Information technology sector reveals that policy 
actions have tremendous effect in this Industry, evidenced by the decrease of the return 
in this Industry by -16, 2% when there is a surprise policy change of 1%. In 2009 the 
total weight of those industries in the market was approximately 50%, as so the size of 
the Industry does not help to explain the heterogeneous cross Industry response.   
To investigate this problem, the correlation between this industries return and the 
overall economy performance was observed. In lack of a measure for the overall 
economy performance the S&P 500 was used since this measure is intended to measure 
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performance of the broad USA economy. In this sense, when measuring the correlation 
between S&P 500 and the sector indices, results revealed that from the 5 industries with 
high correlation with the economy, 4 of them observed a strong relationship to the 
FOMC announcements and their daily return. A possible justification for the cross 
industry effect would be that the industries where the return varies more with the 
economic condition were also the ones that reacted more strongly to policy 
announcements. 
The results are in accordance with the ones obtained by Gert Peersman and Frank Smets 
(2002) for the European market. The durability of the goods produced seem to be an 
important factor when analyzing the relationship between the FOMC announcement and 
the stock market. Higher durability sectors (Consumer Discretionary, Industrial, 
information and technology and Materials) revealed a stronger relationship with the 
FOMC announcements when compared with lower durability sectors (Consumer 
Staples, Utilities).   
4.5 Subprime effect  
Since the subprime there are 14 observations. However, two outliers have been 
excluded for policy analyses: 22
nd
 of January 2008 when the Fed made the first 
unscheduled rate cut announcement since 2001 leading to the biggest surprise 
component observed in the data collection, surprisingly the equity market went down by 
-0.18%. The second outlier occurred in the 8
th
 of October 2008 observation when global 
Central Banks cut the rates in a synchronized effort to fight global turn down that lead 
to a surprise of -0.14% however the equity market responded negatively to global 
cooperation news and came down by -0.40%. 
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Appendix 10 illustrates the effect of the twelve observations in the original regression. 
Results revealed that for both cases: accounting and not accounting for equity market 
volatility, the quality of the regression decreases. Both regressions showed to be free of 
serial correlation, however both regressions revealed to be contaminated by the presence 
of heteroskedasticity. The white test analysis rejected the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity. Under heteroskedasticity the model still produce unbiased 
coefficients nevertheless they are no longer Best Linear Unbiased Estimators (BLUE) 
and the estimated squared error showed to be incorrect. In this sense, confidence 
intervals and hypotheses tests were assumed to be not reliable. 
Though results revealed the presence of heteroskedasticity, the analysis proceeded. In 
order to isolate the subprime effect an interaction term involving a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for those observations since the subprime and the surprise component has 
been included on the original regression (Appendix 11). Although the value of this 
dummy is only significant at the 10% significance level the sign and magnitude of the 
coefficient clearly report a change on the equity market behavior since the subprime. 
Those regressions tell us that a 1% positive policy surprise since the subprime will 
induce the market to rise around 8% more when compared to the observations before 
the subprime, indicating a change in the behavior by the market investors. 
A possible explanation for this change of behavior is that the subprime crises lead to an 
unprecedented confidence crisis on the credit market which almost stagnate the 
interbank credit market. As so investors who associated target rate cuts with future 
improving credit conditions may now see the transference of this better conditions to the 
business market has more doubtful.  A more reasonable explanation might be inherent 
to the VIX index. The average price of the index before the subprime was 19 and the 
23 
 
average after appeared to be 32. As so, “the noise” associated with other news on 
announcement days appeared to be higher since the subprime crisis turning the use of 
daily data old-fashioned. Using intraday data would probably lead to much more precise 
and significant values. 
5. Conclusion 
After using a more stable data set and including one more explainable variable on the 
model to study the relationship between the stock market and Fed policy action, results 
revealed a good estimation of the relation analyzed: equity market goes down by 5.7% 
whenever there is a surprise of 1% on the market. This regression obtained a R
2
 of 
24.4% which is a superior value in comparison to previous researches.  
Moreover, the financial markets seem to react differently if the policy surprise is 
associated with a no change on the target rate by the Federal Reserve. On the other hand 
the sign of the policy surprise itself do not seem to influence the relationship between 
the stock market and the Federal announcements.  
A significant heterogeneous cross industry response to policy announcements was 
verified. This can be explained by the way industry returns are related with the domestic 
economic situation. The durability of the goods produced seems also to have different 
sensibilities to policy announcements among economic sectors. Further research 
however should be conducted to assess which specific industry characteristics are 
related with policy announcement response.  
Lastly, it was verified a significant change on the behavior from the stock market as a 
reaction to policy announcements after the recent subprime crisis. Results however 
revealed to be severely contaminated by the presence of heteroskedasticity. Even so, it 
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is possible to conclude that since the subprime market investors have clearly changed 
the behavior when responding to a policy surprise. This outcome may be biased by the 
limitation of using daily data instead of intraday data. It would be interesting to perform 
using intraday data to assess the subprime effect more accurately. 
The results of this study may help equity investors making more efficient decisions, 
assuming that estimations of the market response to policy announcements has been 

















1) Bernanke, Bens S. and Kenneth N. Kuttner. 2005. “What Explains the Stock Market’s 
Reaction to Federal Reserve Policy?”, The Journal of Finance, LX(3): 1221-1256  
2) Cook, Timothy and Thomas Hahn. 1988. “The effect of changes in the Federal Funds Rate 
Target on Market Interest Rates in the 1970’s”, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, working 
papers: 88-4,  
3) Christiano, Lawrence J., Eichenbaum, Martin, Evans, Charles. 1996. “The effects of 
Monetary Policy Shocks: Evidence from the Flow of Funds”. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 78 (1): 16-34. 
4) Ehrmann, Michael and Marcel Fratzscher. 2004. “Taking stock: Monetary Policy 
Transmission to Equity Markets”, European Central Bank Working Series (354): 11-15. 
http://www.rulesforuse.org  
5) Fuhrer, Jeff and Geoff Tootell. 2004. “Eyes on the Prize: How Did the Fed Respond to the 
Stock Market?”, Public Policy Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (04-2) 
6) Gürkaynak, Refet S., Brian Sack and Eric T. Swanson. 2004. “Do Actions Speak Louder 
Than Words? The Response of Asset Prices to Monetary Policy Actions and Statements”, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, (Washington, DC) 
7) Gürkaynak, Refet S. 2005. “Using Federal Funds Futures Contracts for Monetary Policy 
Analysis”, In Finance and Economics Discussion Series Divisions of Research & Statistics and 
Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D. C. 
8) Gürkaynak, Refet S., Brian Sack and Eric Swanson. 2006. “Market-Based Measures of 
Monetary Policy Expectations”, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO 
WORKING PAPER SERIES: 1-11. 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2006/wp06-04bk.pdf 
9) Kuttner, Kenneth N. 2000. “Monetary Policy and Interest Rates: Evidence from the Fed 
Funds Futures Market”: 1-18. 
10) Nosal, Ed. 2001. “How Well Does the Federal Funds Futures Rate Predict the Future 
Federal Funds Rate?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland: 1-4. 
11) Peersman, Gert and Frank Smets. 2002. “The Industry Effects of Monetary Policy in the 
Euro Area”, European Central Bank, working paper series: nº 165: 1-34. 
12) Piazzesi, Monika and Eric Swanson. 2006. “Futures Prices as Risk-Adjusted Forecasts of 
Monetary Policy”:1-19. 
13) Perez-Quiros, Gabriel and Allan Timmermann. 1999.  “Firm Size and Cyclical Variations in 
Stock Returns”. (July 15) 




15) Rigobon, Roberto and Brian Sack. 2003. “Measuring the reaction of Monetary Policy to the 
Stock Market”, Quarterly Journal of Economics: 639-648.  
16) Roley, V. Vance and Gordon H. Sellon. 1995. “Monetary Policy Actions and Long Term 
Interest Rates”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Quartely: 73-89.  
17) Rudebusch, Glenn. 1998. “Do Measures of Monetary Policy in a VAR Make Sense?”, 
International Economic Review 39(4): 907-931 
18) Thorbecke, Willem. 1997. “On Stock Market Returns and Monetary Policy”, The Journal of 


















Appendix 1: Relationship between the implied rate and the expectations of target 
federal rates. 













 Accounting for VIX  
regressor  Coefficient  Std. Error Coefficient  Std. Error 
          
Intercept  0.175633 (0.0929) 0.155077 (0.091326) 
          
Expected  0.853926 (0.464582) 0.957991 (0.456761) 
          
Unexpected  -7.479132 (-1.433604) -5.712104 (1.584885) 
         
Unexpected x        
Vix_dummy - - -7.616310 (3.176709) 
          
R-squared 0.204164 0.244738 
 
 
Appendix 4: The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation Lagrange Multiplier test for serial 
correlation (Eviews Software) 
For Regression(a) 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.928171     Prob. F(2,106) 0.398464 
Obs*R-squared 1.910448     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.384726 
     
     
 
For Regression (b) 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 1.230625     Prob. F(2,105) 0.296288 
Obs*R-squared 2.542301     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.280509 
     






Appendix 5: The white`s test (Eviews Software) 
For Regression (a) 
 
White Heteroskedasticity Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.589416     Prob. F(5,105) 0.708053 
Obs*R-squared 3.030426     Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.695295 
     
     
 
For Regression (b) 
White Heteroskedasticity Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 1.554789     Prob. F(8,102) 0.147864 
Obs*R-squared 12.06460     Prob. Chi-Square(8) 0.148345 
     
     
 
 
Appendix 6: The t-test statistic 
t - statistic 
Regression (a) 
Variable Std. Error t-Statistic Critical value  
INTERCEPT 0.092900   1.890570 1.95996 Accept 
EXPECTED 0.464582   1.838051 1.95996 Accept 
UNEXPECTED 1.433604 -5.217013 1.95996 Reject 
Regression (b) 
Variable Std. Error t-Statistic Critical value   
INTERCEPT 0.091326 1.698063 1.95996 Accept 
EXPECTED 0.456761 2.097357 1.95996 Reject 
UNEXPECTED 1.584885 -3.604113 1.95996 Reject 
UNEXPECTED x      







Appendix 7: The F-statistic 
F - statistic 
Regression (a) 
F-Statistic Critical value   
13.85315 3.949 Reject 
Regression (b) 
F-Statistic Critical value   
11.55755 3.480 Reject 
 
 
Appendix 8: Results for three different types of asymmetries 
 (c) (d) (e) 
        
Intercept  0.071694 0.135021 0.172403 
  (0.106052) (0.094175) (0.090109) 
Expected  0.942522 0.878607 1.138986 
  (0.454101) (0.465905) (0.456515) 
Unexpected  -7.380373 -6.531946 -7.174540 
  (1.919737) (1.836323) (1.695591) 
Unexpected x       
Vix_dummy -6.816729 -6.795899 -6.898574 
  (3.200912) (3.311810) (3.139474) 
Surprise >0 5.900831 - - 
  (3.881066) - - 
Rate change>0 - 3.439931 - 
  - (3.880166) - 
Rate change=0 - - 8.665164 
  - - (3.968545) 
R2 0.260857 0.250297 0.277245 
No serial Correlation Yes yes yes 





Appendix 9: The cross industry regression. 




Intercept  Expected  Unexpected  
         
Consumer Discretionary 0.209930 0.809262 -10.96771 
0.280322 
  (-0,109582) (0.548007) (1.691037) 
         
Inf.Technolo 0.319924 2.041316 -16.15257 
0.266949 
  (0.169374) (0.847022) (2.613734) 
         
Industrials 0.181092 0.589010 -9.077150 
0.243581 
  (0.099767) (0.498923) (1.539575) 
         
Financials    0.223574     0.781787 -9.191154 
0.173257 
  (0.125304) (0.626633) (1.933659) 
         
Materials 0.259223 -0.277591 -7.101629 
0.140503 
  (0.116073)   (0.580470) (1.791211) 
         
Telec.Services -0.136997 0.623555 -2.578563 
0.018735 
  (0.132133) (0.660786) (2.039049) 
         
Health Care 0.185839 0.521286 -1.283520 
0.012089 
  (0.105325) (0.526720) (1.625350) 
         
Energy    0.200777    -0.398106 -1.325453 
0.010564 
  (0.123580) (0.618009) (1.907048) 
         
Utilities 0.056789 -0.352842 -0.639019 
0.007811 
  (0.099397) (0.497076) (1.533874) 
         
Consumer Staples 0.066879 0.363220 -0.480611 
0.006688 







Appendix 10: Sub prime effect 
 
  (a) Original Regression (b) Accounting for VIX  
regressor  Coefficient  Std. Error Coefficient  Std. Error 
          
Intercept  0.337843 (0.108964) 0.334112 (0.111149) 
          
Expected  -0.480170 (0.480010) -0.462585 (0.490735) 
          
Unexpected  -5.238854 (1.663884) -5.258348 (1.673696) 
          
Unexpected x         
Vix_dummy - - -0.281013 (1.478585) 
          





Appendix 11: Subprime effect (With Dummy) 
 
  (a) Original Regression (b) Accounting for VIX  
regressor  Coefficient  Std. Error Coefficient  Std. Error 
          
Intercept  0.341767 (0.108161) 0.335265 (0.110274) 
          
Expected  -0.467546 (0.476422) -0.436374 (0.487108) 
          
Unexpected  -6.362059 (1.779817) -6.415490 (1.793496) 
          
Unexpected x         
Vix_dummy - - -0.494710 (1.472258) 
Subprime dummy 7.728587 (4.570191) 7.860107 (4.603846) 
          
R-squared 0.113872 0.114712 
 
